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BUREA-ucRAcy CONVICTS ITSELF: THE BALLINGER-PINCHOT CONTROVERSY
OF 1910. By Alpheus Thomas Mason. New York: The Viking Press, 1941.
Pp. 224. $2.50.
THERE are two customary reasons for opening up an ancient controversy.'
One is the discovery of new materials; the other is a fresh interpretation. Pro-
fessor Mason's book cannot be justified on either ground. Apparently it was
his intention to refurbish a somewhat tarnished halo.
There is no evidence, internal or bibliographic, that Professor Mason con-
sulted: (1) the Agriculture files in the National Archives, (2) the Taft papers
in the Library of Congress, or (3) the Ballinger papers in the Department of
the Interior, although all of these materials are available to scholars.
The book is little more than a rehash of the sensational story--familiar to
the readers of Collier's Weekly thirty years ago-of how Gifford Pinchot, with
the aid of others, succeeded in ruining Taft's Secretary of the Interior, Richard
A. Ballinger, and incidentally, in wrecking Taft's Administration. The affair
represented the perfect flowering of yellow journalism. Today more and more
people are coming to the view that, as I have pointed out elsewhere,2 Ballinger
was the victim of a vicious conspiracy.
In passing, Professor Mason attempts a fumigation of Pinchot and Glavis,
but his main purpose seems to be to exonerate former justice Brandeis from
charges that have never been made against him. The most that has been alleged
against Brandeis was that he was probably misinformed as to the facts by the
none too scrupulous Pinchot and the overzealous Glavis. Professor Mason
has done the former Justice a disservice in explaining where no explanations
have been called for.
In his heading of the fourth chapter, Partisans and Patriots in Search of a
Villain, the author unwittingly gives away his whole case. The side that he
espouses is snow white; the other is ebony black. It is somewhat embarrassing
to have to make the point that a scholar is at least expected to pretend to weigh
the evidence and not be guilty of doctrinaire bias which serves neither truth
nor justice.
An example of Professor Mason's prejudice is his amazing ridicule (pp. 65,
83 and 182) of Ballinger for refusing, as Secretary of the Interior, to pass
upon cases in which he had been involved as a lawyer. It seems to be necessary
1. The Ballinger-Pinchot controversy was the cause c~ldbre of the Taft administra-
tion. Arising out of charges brought by conservationist Gifford Pinchot against Taft's
Secretary of the Interior, Richard Ballinger, in connection with some allegedly fraudulent
Alaska coal field claims, this affair was dramatically spotlighted in the press and in Con-
gressional halls for over a year. [ED.]
2. See my Not Guilty! Richard A. Ballinger-An American Dreyfus in THE SAT-
URDAY EVENING POST, fay 25, 1940. See also, my NOT GUILTY. A. OFFICIAL N:;QU"1Y
Ixro THE CrArGEs MADE By GLAviS AND PiNcHoT AGAINsr RicnMIW A. BALhaNcM,,
SECRETARY OF THE INTEIOR, 1909-1911 (U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1940), which
traces the story in considerable detail.
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to apprise Professor Mason of the fact that, in taking the very proper action
that he did, Ballinger was merely showing himself to be responsive to elemen-
tary legal ethics. Professor Mason scoffingly denounces as "prostitution of
law" the insistence, not only by Ballinger but by two of the ablest lawyers of
the time-namely, President Taft and Attorney General Wickersham-that
the Secretary of the Interior was bound by the oath that he took to admin-
ister his office in accordance with the law (p. 189). To this scholar "the
law" served Ballinger merely as an excuse for "bureaucratic intransigence."
In full cry against Ballinger as nothing short of a corruptionist and malfeasant
in public office, he unwittingly throws away his case, when be says (p. 94) :
"Neither Glavis nor Pinchot charged corruption; what their case against Bal-
linger and his subordinates boiled down to was nothing more than conduct
indicating unfitness to hold, rather than criminality in, an office of public trust.8
However conclusive and overwhelming the proof brought to support this some-
what nebulous charge . . ."
In the author's view, if everything that Pinchot's victim, Ballinger, did, or
failed to do, was contemptible, maleficent perhaps, or even criminal, every-
thing that Gifford Pinchot did showed the nobility of his character. Under
cross-examination on the witness stand, Pinchot admitted that he had lied in
a letter that he had written to President Taft. To Professor Mason, this was
merely "impulsive enthusiasm" (p. 74). What a mistake Ananias made in not
more carefully choosing his biographer! Also, according to Professor Mason,
Pinchot's conspiracy against an honest and innocent public official was "for-
tunate for conservationists" (p. 74).
Unfortunately, Professor Mason's "impulsive enthusiast," "upon cross-ex-
amination . . . was forced to confess 'mistakes'; to admit that, on salient
points in his direct assertion, he lacked the support of any personal knowledge
whatever" (pp. 115-116). Despite this damaging admission, Professor Ma-
son comes to the strange conclusion that: "The artful closing argument of his
counsel [George Wharton Pepper] was a fitting climax to Pinchot's complete
vindication" (p. 116).
It would be difficult to reconcile the foregoing quotations from Bureaucracy
Convicts Itself with the thesis the author sets out to establish. Perhaps George
Wharton Pepper, counsel for Pinchot, summed it up better than most when lie
said, "Of all the difficult and disagreeable duties I have ever performed this
was the most arduous and nerve-racking" (p. 117).
We hear the purring of the proverbial cat that has just escaped from the
bag when Professor Mason admits, in substance, that the charges against Bal-
linger, as published by Glavis in Colliers W'Veekly, were so nebulous that it was
necessary to "bolster" that publication in order to protect it from a threatened
million-dollar libel suit (p. 94). Convinced that Ballinger was certain to win
such a suit, the editor of Collier's Weekly and his friends, including Pinchot,
held an emergency council of war and decided to engage the services of Louis
D. Brandeis. Mr. Brandeis, whose fee was paid by Collier's Weekly, theoreti-
cally was engaged to represent Glavis before the Congressional investigating




Weekly would be protected against a libel suit. Or, even if Glavis could not
make out a legal case, as he fell far short of doing in the final test, Ballinger
might be so successfully "smeared" by the press that he would not feel like
proceeding further.
Accordingly, the Ballinger investigation was not conducted by the prosecu-
tion for the purpose of convincing the Congressional committee of Ballinger's
guilt except in so far as that might be an incidental result. This would have
been difficult in any event in view of the political complexion of that com-
mittee, although it is impossible to concur in Professor lason's implied
charge that the regular Republican majority was any less partisan or political-
minded than the Democratic minority.
Professor Mason again makes a singular admission when he writes (p.
191) "Brandeis actively participated in this 'objectionable' press campaign,
both during and after the investigation. He held conferences almost daily
with newspapermen, noting for them the high points of the proceedings. The
editors of Collier's consulted him frequently, followed his advice implicitly
as to topics to be singled out for publicity, and sent him their editorial proofs
for correction and approval."
Professor Mason speaks of Glavis' "simple and unshakable testimony"
(p. 101). The truth is that, under cross-examination, Glavis - who was
the chief witness against Ballinger-had to admit that he had no real case
against the Secretary of the Interior, whom he and Pinchot were out to de-
stroy. I quote from the official record of the hearing:4
"Mr. Vertrees [counsel for Ballinger]: So you wish to say to
this committee that as the result of your investigations, you have ob-
served nowhere a corrupt motive as to any of these officers; you state
that, do you?
"Mr. Glavis: Well, yes, sir; there was no evidence of it.
"Mr. Vertrees: You say no corrupt conduct on the part of any
of them, but the most you wish to be understood as saying . . . was
simply that you did not think the affairs of the Government, that is
those conducted by the Interior Office, were in safe hands?
"Mr. Glavis: Yes, sir."
Professor Mason reluctantly admits (p. 181) that "while Ballinger may
not have been technically guilty of any offense, or consciously unfaithful in
his trust, the circumstances surrounding . . ."
The "circumstances surrounding" had nothing whatever to do with any act
of omission or commission on the part of Ballinger as Secretary of the Inte-
rior. Those "circumstances surrounding" relate to the predated "Summary
and Report" by Attorney General Wickersham and the suppressed memoran-
dum by Assistant Attorney General Lawler. It was these two purely tactical
episodes that the Pinchot cabal fanned into burning issues with which to de-
stroy the reputation of a public official who was innocent of malfeasance, and
even of nonfeasance.
The predating of written instruments is not even a novelty either in govern-
ment or in the practice of the law. Besides, Ballinger had nothing to do with
4. SEN. Doc. 719, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1910) Vol. 3, 435-438.
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this predating. He may not even have known of it. And as for the Lawler
memorandum, which also was prepared by the direct order of President Taft
-that, too, had nothing to do with Ballinger's guilt or innocence. It was merely
Lawler's opinion of the manner in which Ballinger had conducted himself as
Secretary of the Interior. Moreover, President Taft did not even adopt this
memorandum as his own. As Professor Mason says (p. 164), "The Presi-
dent adopted only a few paragraphs of it, notably those in which Mr. Lawler,
writing as if he were President, heaped praise on his chief, Secretary Bal-
linger."
And again (p. 167), "Lawler did not, it seems, set forth the case in all
particulars entirely as Taft wished."
Yet, under the vigorous onslaughts of Mr. Brandeis, Ballinger was convicted
in public opinion because President Taft asked his Attorney General to pre-
pare and predate a written memorandum embodying an oral report already
made to him, and because, again at the instance of the President, Assistant
Attorney General Lawler prepared a memorandum of which "the President
adopted only a few paragraphs . . ."
The Lawler memorandum should not have been suppressed. But even
this improper act could not be attributed, even indirectly, to Ballinger. The
Lawler report should have been presented to the investigating committee with
all of the other papers pertinent to the inquiry; but unhappily, the suppression
of the Lawler memorandum was not the only suppression. The public did not
know, and so far as appears affirmatively from the record, no member of the
investigating committee knew, that it was Collier's Weekly that had retained
Brandeis, at a fee of $25,000; that while Brandeis' appearance had been entered
for Glavis, he was in fact the attorney for a magazine that needed all of the
help his brilliance could render in order to ward off the possibility of a smash-
ing attack for libel. As already shown, the editors of Colliers Weekly "con-
sulted Brandeis frequently, followed his advice implicitly, and submitted to him
their editorial proofs for correction and approval" (p. 191).
Among other "Patriots in Search of a Villain" (p. 99), Professor Mason
enumerates the ineffable Kerby who, as one of Secretary Ballinger's stenogra-
pliers, had taken down and transcribed the Lawler memorandum. Whatever
views one may hold as to the violation of the highly confidential relationship
that exists between a public official and his secretary, one can but marvel at
the lyrical language employed by Professor Mason in introducing Kerby to
his readers (p. 160):
"As a Sunday-school superintendent, his sensitive conscience (sicl!) troubled
him . . . A newspaper syndicate wanted the story, and the interested news-
papermen told him his patriotic duty (sic!) demanded that he devulge the
facts. At last . . . cautious patriot Kerby prepared and gave out, on promise
of a job from a newspaper syndicate, a long statement for the press." r
A wise colored man once said that there are three sides to every question:
my side, your side, and the truth. This reviewer, despite slurs on the part'of
Professor Mason, is not interested in the Ballinger side, nor the Pinchot side,




real truth of the Ballinger-Pinchot episode merely because he battled at Arma-
geddon in 1912 side by side with the man G who, it later turned out. was tile
chief conspirator against a public official who was innocent of any crime other
than that of disagreement with Pinchot. This reviewer is interested in the
truth.
Professor Mason's book does not fall within this category. It is a work of
propaganda, simple but not pure. Its real thesis seems to be that, although
Ballinger was not guilty as charged, one who ventures now to correct a griev-
ous wrong, violates the principle of the old school tie.
HAROLD L. ICKFS-1
THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY. By Robert H. Jackson. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941. Pp. xx, 361. $3.00.
FOR the life of the Supreme Court and its function in our government, the
New Deal presented an extraordinary combination of circumstances and a
mortal challenge. In 1932 the people voted for a new government pledged
to a new conception of its responsibilities and energetic action to lift the
country from the overwhelming depression into which it had sunk. But the
Supreme Court was neither party nor privy to this bargain. Both the legis-
lative and the executive branches of the government were turned over to the
new personnel which had made the pledge. But there was no change in the
composition of the Supreme Court. The new government fell to its task and
enacted a body of legislation unprecedented in both its volume and its reach
into the economic and social life of the people. The slogan was "action now"
-experimentation with promising solutions at the inevitable risk of error,
rather than continuing certain failure and waiting for a miracle. But in the
Supreme Court was a group of four Justices, thinking, speaking and voting
as one, able men of courage and strength of character, strong-minded and
strong-willed, who had moulded their own lives and had risen to high station
by their own hard effort and who knew of only one prescription for the
success of a nation, as of an individual. They saw in the Constitution a con-
secration of the way of economic life and of government which they believed
accounted for their own and the nation's prosperity; they regarded themselves
as the ultimate defenders of that way; and they would tolerate no experiment
which they thought threatened it. Concentrating their power, they engaged
the government as it approached with first one piece of legislation, then
another and another.
In "The Struggle For judicial Supremacy," the United States Attorney
General tells the story of these engagements and their sequels. With the
skill of an excellent Solicitor General he describes briefly and dramatically
the New Deal cases in the Supreme Court. He does not pretend to be entirely
neutral as to the wisdom or policy of the legislation involved. But his object
is not the promotion of conviction as to those policies. He describes the
6. Gifford Pinchot. [ED.]
t Secretary of the Interior.
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legislation - its social and economic background, the evils aimed at, the pres-
sures for governmental action and the effects of the Court's adverse decisions
- "only to show the field in which the Court was substituting its judgment
for that of the Congress and the manner in which judicial review governed
our society or economy, as well as its mere effect on legal doctrine." And
he points out not only what the Justices did but also the nasty way in which
they did it: for example, the "denunciatory fervor" and "sanguinary simile"
in the opinion in Jones v. Securities & Exchange Commission, and the design
detected in the opinion in Humphrey's Executor v. United States "to give
the impression that the President had flouted the Constitution, rather than
that the Court had simply changed its mind within the past ten years."'
Some day some one will tell the rest of the fascinating story. The maneuvers
of private counsel in the lower courts and the incredible behavior of some
of the inferior federal judges need more than the few telling pages devoted
to them in this book. The Supreme Court is the ultimate judicial authority
but the lower courts also speak authoritatively; and their power to interfere
with governmental policy is great. Reform in the Supreme Court may be
largely defeated if the lower courts are left untouched. The Attorney General
could also write a thrilling volume on the almost fantastic labors of govern-
ment lawyers prior to the court decisions: their killing exertions to write
legislation with an eye not only to the public need and political factors but
also the Court's past and possible future attitudes; their intricate maneuvers
to avoid, hasten or delay judicial test, and the complicated appraisals of risks
and advantages, choice of case and speculation about specific judges; their
anxious scrutiny of every phrase emanating from the Supreme Tribunal and
the hope or despondency which it produced. And the Attorney General only
whets the appetite for more when he says: "I shall not trace the play of politics,
ambition, animosities and personalities which featured the . . . battle [over*
the Court reorganization plan]. The struggle did little to clarify the under-
lying issues of Judicial Supremacy, for both sides evaded it. . . . Both the
merits and defects of the plan were . . . exaggerated a thousand fold, and
the debate touched some low levels on both sides."
2
Though the New Deal's encounter with the Supreme Court may have been
extraordinary, Mr. Jackson does not regard it as unique. On the contrary,
he views it as a recurring battle in the constant struggle for judicial supremacy,
which is itself part of the deeper conflict between "the power of the voters"
and "the economic power of property." Accordingly, he traces the history
of that struggle through leading Supreme Court cases prior to the New Deal.
He believes that, "from the very nature of its functions," the Supreme Court
has been "deep in power politics" since its establishment. It has undertaken
1. "The decision could easily have forestalled this by recognizing the President's
reliance on the opinion of Chief Justice Taft [in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52
(1926)1. But the decision contained no such gracious acknowledgment" (p. 109). The
Attorney General commits an almost similar lapse in failing to mention that in the
Myers case Chief Justice Taft was speaking only for a majority of a sharply divided
Court and that a minority was strongly of the opinion that even the postmaster there
involved was removed illegally.
2. P. 189.
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to allocate power between state and nation, between legislative and executive
organs, between government and private groups - to resolve "struggles for
power that in Europe call out regiments of troops" and with us "call out
battalions of lawyers." Mr. Jackson sees "basic inconsistency between popular
government and judicial supremacy," inconsistency which every contest with
the Supreme Court in the past, as well as the most recent one, "has ended
in evading" rather than reconciling. Therefore, he would "underwrite no
futures even now." In general outlook, the present Supreme Court is "the
most liberal of any court of last resort in the land." But the Court has
"renounced no power and has been subjected to no new limitation. The
effect of the attack was exemplary and disciplinary and perhaps temporary."
The Court, says Mr. Jackson, "was intended to be, and by its inherent
nature always will prove to be, over the years a relatively conservative in-
stitution," opposing the dynamic party of change. This results from several
pressures. The Justices are drawn only from the legal profession whose
"entire philosophy, interest and training . . . tend toward conservatism.
Its method of thinking, accepted by no other profession, cultivates a supreme
respect for the past, and its order." The tendency is aggravated by the
"official tradition of social and intellectual isolation" with which the judges
live. By their tenure and method of selection, the judges are not responsible
to popular will and are not subject even to the pressure of party organization
to subdue individual preference. Because of the life tenure of its judges,
the Court is "almost never a really contemporary institution." Judges hold
over from one administration to another regardless of the revolutions that
elections may otherwise produce. "And the search for Justices of enduring
liberalism has usually ended in disappointment."
But the Attorney General does "not join those who seek to deflate the
whole judicial process." He recognizes that the cases which he discusses
constitute but one part, and a small part, of "a stream of judicial duties
acceptably, if not always brilliantly, performed." He prefers the battalions
of lawyers to the regiments of troops, and values "the role that the judi-
ciary performs in the peaceful ordering of our society." Some arbiter, he
thinks, is "almost indispensable when power is distributed among many states
and the nation and is also balanced between different branches . . . and
when written and fundanental limitations on all governmental agencies, such
as the Bill of Rights, are set up for protection of the citizen." He therefore
suggests no fundamental change in, or limitations upon, the power of the
Supreme Court. On the contrary: "With us, what is wanted is not innova-
tion, but a return to the spirit with which our early judges viewed the
function of judicial review of legislation - the conviction that it is an avwe-
some thing to strike down an act of the legislature approved by the Chief
Executive, and that power so uncontrolled is not to be used save where the
occasion is clear beyond fair debate."'3
So the Attorney General brings us back to the problems of personnel and
judicial standards. He does not suggest, as also did not the President's Court
proposal, destruction of the Court or the imposition of limitations on its
3. P. 323.
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powers. If there is inconsistency between the principles of popular govern-
ment and judicial review of legislation, it may be just another instance of
the many situations in which we want and attain seemingly inconsistent ends.
That ours is a "government by lawsuit," as Mr. Jackson says, is not due
just to the Supreme Court's power to pass on the constitutionality of legis-
lation, and the characterization would be only a little less apt if that power
were withdrawn. The importance of the spirit with which the judicial function
is viewed can hardly, therefore, be exaggerated.
The spirit of austere self-restraint is indeed difficult to achieve. For human
judges accustomed and required to consider the purpose, wisdom and desir-
ability of legal solutions in their conceded fields of law-making - common
law and enforcement of general statutory standards such as "reasonable" -
such self-renunciation and avoidance of the most interesting comes hard.
The desired spirit is not peculiar to liberals or conservatives. It is a trait
of mind and character, fostered by traditional standards, which can unite
both in unanimous judgment. "Liberal" judges looking for the "liberal"
position without restraint of such standards may sin in the same way as
"conservatives." Nor is the spirit rarer in the legal profession than in others.
Nor, indeed, is it clear that the legal profession is more predominantly con-
servative than others. Lawyers must be aware of the tentative nature of
judgment; they study the past and the precedents not merely to imitate but
to understand and distinguish. Some lawyers are found in the vanguard of
all reform movements; some of the severest criticisms of the judicial process
have been made by lawyers; and the very decisions of which Mr. Jackson
disapproves have been as strongly condemned by Justices of the Supreme
Court. If "the search for Justices of enduring liberalism has usually ended
in disappointment," it has been largely because the search was seldom prose-
cuted and the characteristic seldom made an indispensable condition of ap-
pointment.
But, to be sure, candidates are rare who possess the qualifications requisite
for a Supreme Court Justice -humility and self-restraint in constitutional
adjudication (except when civil liberties are involved) 4 and, in the appli-
cation of statutes and other law, learning, wisdom, breadth of information
and understanding, versatility, statesmanship, and yet another kind of self-
restraint. The lot of such a Justice -as, indeed, the lot of the Court while
its function remains in dispute -is not a happy one. It would be so much
easier to follow his predilections or to choose his side and stay with it to its
great delight.- But, in the long run, his contribution to the public welfare
through the development of judicial standards which can transcend personal
predilection, loyalty or ambition may be much the greater.
HARRY SHULMANt
4. "The presumption of validity which attaches in general to legislative acts is
frankly reversed in the case of interference with frec speech and free assembly, and for
a perfectly cogent reason." P. 285.
1'Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND SiR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932. Edited by Mark DeAVolfe Howe.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. 2 vols. Vol. 1, Pp. xxii, 275,
vol. 2, pp. 358. 7.50.
ARE men the prisoners or the creators of their age? As the clay of their
personality is molded and baked do they come forth with such imprint of the
fingers of the Zeitgeist that they can be put on a shelf and catalogued like
specimens-here is Athenian, here Renaissance, here Victorian ? The puzzle
is eternal because sometimes the specimens won't fit the catalogue and often
we are not sure how to draw the catalogue itself. What was the Zeitgeist of
Holmes and Pollock? Expanding or disintegrating capitalism? The decline
or the renascense of the arts? The enslavement or the liberation of the mass-
es? Pick your labels as you will and then try to place them on these men. It
can't be done. Of course, there are plenty of traits which will enable you to
say, "late Nineteenth, early Twentieth Century". But there are so many others
which will seem to you to be Periclean, Elizabethan, Voltairean. Perhaps we
must place them in a special category which one might call that of the "classic
men", who illumine their own age because, like a lens, they bring to a f,,cus
the rays of light sent out by the ages before.
The sense of timelessness about these two classic men is the more acute
since they are not figures in old books, but men who lately lived with us. and
who now talk from the page in our own idiom about events and ideas which
we ourselves have experienced. It is a peculiar bit of luck which has preserved
a unique series of letters now presented in a model of the editorial skill and
intelligence of Mark Howe. The study of the anatomy of personality could
hardly find a better text than the record of fifty-eight years of intimate com-
munion, and the lessons of the text are fascinating.
Lesson number one is the coincidence of similarity and dissimilarity between
the two men. Both are passionately devoted to the method and tradition of
the common law, omnivorous searchers in the treasure of the past, vet taking
keen delight in the superficial enjoyments of the moment-riding a bicycle.
playing solitaire, reading mystery stories and P. G. Wodehouse. In politics
and economics both were (to use a confusing yet expressive label) Tory Lib-
erals, distrustful of socialism and legislative imprdvement (Holmes: " think
the crowd now has substantially all there is, that the luxuries of the few are a
drop in the bucket, and that unless you make war on moderate comfurt there
is no general economic question." And again Hohnes: "I don't disguise my
belief that the Sherman Act is a humbug based on economic ignorance and in-
competence." Pollock: ". . . the Labour Party with its frank and blatant
policy of plunder as a bait to the Have-nots"), yet with deep instinct and
concern for individual freedom. This attitude is one which those who find
social reform and civil liberties indissolubly linked find hard to understand.
The ability to divide them is brilliantly illustrated by Iolmes: "I, who liruIJ-
ably take the extremist view in favor of free speech, in which, in the abstract,
I have no very enthusiastic belief, though I hope I would die for it . . ."
And in commenting on Gitlow v. Ncw York: "My last performance during
the term . . .was a dissent . . . in favor of the rights of an anarchist
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(so-called) to talk drool in favor of the proletarian dictatorship. But the
prevailing notion of free speech seems to be that you may say what you
choose if you don't shock me."
Despite these superficial traits of similarity, the net resultant of personality
is sharply different. Holmes is gayer (this at 54: "You may say what you
like about American women-and I won't be unpatriotic-but English women
are brought up, it seems to me, to realize that it is an object to be charming,
that man is a dangerous animal-or ought to be-and that a sexless bonhomie
is not the ideal relation." And this at 78: "I don't know what it is about the
Washington weather but I have a brown plush mouth there all the time as if
I had been on a spree but without having had the fun"), humbler, yet more
skeptical. Pollock was more learned, so very, very learned. -le studied Per-
sian and Russian and seemed to know everything about everything. He was
a witty man (read his wonderful letter on being ill) and well rounded (in a
single letter he boils down the law of trade combinations for the use of the
Labour Commission, lectures on Anglo-Saxon law, founds a fencing club,
writes a book on the early history of mountaineering and joins an association
of real property lawyers). But through it all there is a subtle impression of stuf-
finess and even of conceit. Those who didn't know enough could expect little
mercy from his judgment: Austin "did not know enough law" and "this is
why he has a reputation among half-educated publicists"; Carlyle's "plunge
into the middle ages--of which I believe he knew nothing-in Past and Pres-
ent was, if I remember riiht, more free from blunders than might have been
expected"; Remy de Gourmont didn't know much about mediaeval Latin;
Renan was "rather out of his depth" in the history of ethics. Pollock's devo-
tion to historical learning betrays him, more than once, into a humorless pe-
danticism: People in London say Harold Laski is a Communist, "which I
can hardly believe considering his historical learning"; . . . "The element
of truth in Socialism is to my mind something the Common Law knew long
before any modern Socialists were born . . . Our lady the Common Law
is a very wise old lady though she still has something to learn in telling
what she knows."
It is remarkable that nowhere do we find Holmes exhibiting the slightest
trace of irritation at these traits in his friend. Indeed, hardly ever is there sub-
stantial disagreement between the two. When it happens, the divergence of
opinion is so illuminative of vital essence that one wishes that it had oc-
curred more often. Thus, Holmes found Brooks Adams' Law of Civilization
and Decay "about the most (immediately) interesting history I ever read . . .
It hardly strikes me as science but rather as a somewhat grotesque world poem,
or symphony in blue and gray, but the story of the modern world is told so
strikingly that while you read you believe it." The very quality which attract-
ed Holmes repelled Pollock. He thought the book "clever, as the book of a
smart young man full of one idea is clever," but, a typical Pollockism, one of
Adams' central points "is very funny to anyone who knows any mediaeval
history or literature." Divergence is more sharply etched in judgment on Theo-
dore Roosevelt. When Pollock finished reading Howland's biography it made
him "think even more highly of Roosevelt than we did, and worse of some
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other people . . . If only he could have been your war President: he had
something of a blind spot for the legal point of view and the distinction between
legal and political justice, but that would not have mattered for the war."
Holmes was so much more discerning, neither as much taken in by Roose-
velt's strenuousness nor as disapproving of his disrespect for the law; lut then,
of course, he knew his subject better and had cause for personal pique. It is
worth quoting in full:
"Of course I pretty well made up my package about him a gotd
while ago, and I don't think I was too much disturbed by what you
admit to and what was formulated by a Senator in his day tlus:
'What the boys like about Roosevelt is that he doesn't care a damn
for the law.' It broke up our incipient friendship, however, as he
looked on my dissent to the Northern Securities case as a political de-
parture (or, I suspect, more truly, couldn't forgive anyone who stood
in his way). We talked freely later but it was never the same after
that, and if he had not been restrained by his friends, I am told that
he would have made a fool of himself and would have excluded me
from the White House-and as in his case about the law, so in mine
about that, I never cared a damn whether I went there or not. He
was very likeable, a big figure, a rather ordinary intellect, with ex-
traordinary gifts, a shrewd and I think pretty unscrupulous politi-
cian. He played all his cards-if not more. R.i.p."
If these little snippets of conversation convey a notion of topical sparkle and
many-sided thinking and doing, the impression must be recognized as of sec-
ondary importance beside the sense of timelessness breathing out from the
whole of the letters. Nothing conveys this sense better than the absence of
development, especially striking in the case of Holmes. The man is in his late
thirties when the book opens, in his early nineties when it closes. Yet there
is so little change, so little of the movement of ideas and activities which we
think of as growth of personality. Astounding paradox, this is no sign of
weakness, but of overwhelming strength. It is as if he had achieved so early
in life a high plateau on which his spirit could dwell through nearly six decades
and always be above ordinary mortals wearily climbing up from below. The
distrust of absolutes, which we sometimes think a hallmark of contemporary
jurisprudence, appears in the very earliest letters with a reference to Langdell
as representing "the powers of darkness. He is all for logic and hates any ref-
erence to anything outside of it . . ." Years later: " My intellectual furniture
consists of an assortment of general propositions which grow fewer and more
general as I grow older. I always say that the chief end of man is to frame
them and no general proposition is worth a damn." And then at the very end
of life, after passing ninety: "I can imagine a book on the law, getting rid of all
talk of duties and rights-beginning with the definition of lav in the lawyer's
sense as a statement of the circumstances in which the public force will be
brought to bear upon a man through the Courts, and expounding rights as the
hypostasis of a prophesy."
As with-philosophy so with life. At the beginning is the judgment: "If a
man get a year's life out of a year he can ask no more." And no more is ever
1941] 1313
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
asked, for "life is like an artichoke; each day, week, month, year, gives you
one little bit which you nibble off-but precious little compared with what you
throw away." So that approaching eighty Holmes could say: "I was repining
at the thought of my slow progress-how few new ideas I had or picked up--
when it occurred to me to think of the total of life and how the greater part
was wholly absorbed in living and continuing life . . . And I bid myself ac-
cept the common lot . . . in short realize life as an end in itself. Functioning
is all there is-only our keenest pleasure is in what we call the higher sort.
I wonder if cosmically an idea is any more important .than the bowels."
The lives of the classic men always call forth an envious nostalgia. "There
were giants in those days." Now we have only epigones, But these giants
were with us only the other day; perhaps there are others to come. Or has
their day passed? Is the future for the warrior alone or is there still place for
contemplation and the forging of ideas rather than guns? Yet Holmes was a
warrior as well as a philosopher; a warrior who "loathed war"; a philosopher
who believed nonetheless that force is the ultima ratio and the only remedy
"between two groups that want to make inconsistent kinds of world."
A. H. FELLERt
CASES AND OTHER MATERIAL ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE. Third Edition.
By William Reynolds Vance. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1940. Pp.
xxxvi, 964. $6.00.
THE past decade has seen an enormous growth in the magnitude and
importance of the insurance business. This is evidenced not only by an
increase in company assets and insurance in force, but also by the introduc-
tion and expanding use of many new and varied forms of insurance. The
emphasis has been shifting from fire to casualty lines, with new types of
life underwriting also coming into prominence. There has been renewed
stress on state control and supervision of insurance companies, while recent
federal investigation points toward probable federal control of some kind
in the near future. This combination of facts necessarily results in more
insurance litigation, making a knowledge and understanding of insurance
law ever more important to the attorney, whether acting as counsellor, advo-
cate or legislator.
Into this setting comes the third edition of the late Professor Vance's
casebook. To serve as an effective teaching tool, an insurance casebook should
be up-to-date, take cognizance of current social and economic conditions, and
stimulate the student's interest in further study. Professor Vance's book
satisfies all of these requirements. It is surprisingly modern, even for a new
casebook. Of the approximately two hundred and sixty cases included
in the body of the book, more than seventy-five per cent were decided since
1930, and more than twenty-five per cent during 1938 and 1939. In addition,
the scope of the book is 'nationwide, for decisions are taken from courts in
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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some four-fifths of the states, from all ten of the circuit courts of appeal, and
-a sizeable number- from the United States Supreme Court. Further-
more, there has been a marked attempt to fit the cases into the socio-economdc
pattern, so that the student will not overlook the important influence of this
pattern upon the business and law of insurance. The footnotes are meaty
with a wealth of stimulating problems and questions and with citations to
and excerpts from statutes, law review articles and decisions; text material
is interspersed throughout the book.
The organization in the third edition is fundamentally the same as in the
second. The problems develop logically as they ordinarily appear in connec-
tion with the insurance contract. After treating the Scope and Function
of Insurance at some length, and Insurable Interest rather briefly, the author
proceeds seriatim to consider Making the Contract, Premiums, Ascertain-
ment and Control of Risk, Waiver and Estoppel, Rights Arising under Life
Policies, Rights and Remedies of Creditors of Insured and Remedial Pro-
cedures. There is an abridgement of the material on Ascertainment and
Control of Risk, especially with respect to warranties which are today prob-
ably of more academic than practical importance. Rights and Remedies of
Creditors of Insured and Remedial Procedures are expanded into new chAp-
ters. The latter contains a section on Declaratory Judgments -a subject
which has recently become important for parties to an insurance contract.
The last six chapters consider the construction of various kinds of insurance
contracts, with Group Insurance and Liability Insurance assuming new im-
portance and Marine Insurance omitted. The forms in the Appendix remain
the same except the "Standard Form of Lloyd's Marine Policy" is displaced
by "A Form of Automobile Liability Policy." A helpful addition is the use
of headnotes as an introduction to the chapters. These indicate the purpose
in presenting the material to follow, briefly explain its content, direct the
attention to particularly significant cases and stress the social import of the
material. A Table of Legal Periodicals at the front of the book is also certain
to prove useful.
A few minor criticisms may be noted. As in the second edition, historical
material is largely eliminated. Although not higlfdy important to the insur-
ance law of today, it might be advantageous to summarize -by text material
or a few relevant cases - the background of the present law. Again, there
is a noticeable paucity of material on state regulation, now more important
than ever. Inclusion of such cases as Gcrmnan Alliance Iiisurancc Company
v. Lewis, National Uniion Fire Insurance Company v. WVanbcrg, O'Gorman
and Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insuranec Company, and Osborn v. Ozlin
would at least indicate the scope of such influence.
In spite of some reduction in size, the casebook still appears too extensive
for a three-hour semester course, which exceeds the time allotment in most
law schools. This difficulty has been partially obviated by a table of suggested
omissions which will prove extremely valuable where a shorter course is
given. The expediency of devoting as much as one-third of the material to
construction problems may be questioned. The controversies are so dependent
upon the varied fact situations that many of them might better be covered
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by textual discussion or footnote treatment. The more important, such as
the incontestable clause and liability insurance, could still be stressed by
separate consideration.
On the whole, this edition appears to be a distinct improvement over its
predecessor. To one who has not yet had the opportunity to put the book
to the test of classroom use, the cases appear to be well selected and accom-
panied by more than adequate footnotes. There is presented a considerable
amount of valuable statutory and textual material, as well as numerous
excerpts of so-called "non-legal" character. There are even extracts from
daily newspapers, discussing current insurance problems. This abundance
of material should arouse the student's interest in the increasing importance
of insurance.
No one was better qualified than Professor Vance to compile a casebook
on the law of insurance. His many years of thorough study of the subject
and his numerous significant contributions to the field command the respect
of insurance men and the legal profession alike. This third and last of his
editions is another outstanding contribution, and marks the summation of
a long and distinguished career.
ROBERT L. TAYLORt
THE SECOND DUMA. A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND TUE
RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT. By Alfred Levin. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1940. Pp. ix, 414. $3.00.
DR. Levin's study of the relations of the Social-Democratic party (the Men-
sheviks and Bolsheviks were then precariously united) with the Russian Duma
of 1907 is especially pertinent today, and should find a wide circle of readers
outside students of Russian history. For it presents a phenomenon of political
life which was then exceptional, but which has arisen frequently to bewilder
and bedevil post-1918 Europe,-that of a parliament struggling to survive
despite the presence within it of parties hostile to any parliamentary system of
representation and eager to prove it unworkable and to replace it by authori-
tarian rule. Approached in this light, Dr. Levin's detailed and thoughtful
account of the second Duma offers a valuable case-study of the role of parlia-
ment in a country which was lacking in developed parliamentary traditions
and was beset by social problems of long standing and immense complexity.
The author was soundly guided in selecting the second Duma for his study.
With the ebbing of the revolutionary movement of 1905-1906, whether the
newly convened Duma would survive and become a permanent and essential
part of the Russian governmental structure was a very acute question. The
change in sentiment from the first to the second Duma could best be meas-
ured by the new tactics adopted by the most parliamentary of the Russian
parties, the Kadets, who had become anxious to perpetuate and strengthen
tAssociate Professor of Law, University of Louisville Law School.
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the Duma instead of using it merely as a rallying-point against the autocracy.
The attempt of this bourgeois liberal party to unite the entire opposition
against the Government and at the same time to "envelop" the Government
by making useful contributions to the country's progress through formulating
a progressive legislative policy, foundered in large measure on the attitude of
the Social Democrats: their contempt for the Duma and their insistence on
using it solely as a forum for mass revolutionary agitation. The upshot of the
weeks' long struggle over the second Duma was Stolypin's drastic revision of
the election law, which assured the Government of a more amenable assembly,
but which conversely left the masses disillusioned with the Duma as an effect-
ive arena of struggle. Dr. Levin has given a thorough and enlightening account
of the ensuing three-way duel between the reaction, the Kadets, and the revo-
lutionary Left, in which the two extremes joined, unwittingly, to devour the
center.
The strong point of Dr. Levin's study lies in his careful, day-to-day docu-
mentation of the brief life of the second Duma, based on a full use of parlia-
mentary and newspaper reports and of memoirs. This very strength bears,
however, a germ of weakness. During most of the book the author is so com-
pletely immersed in the details of the parliamentary struggles that he is in dan-
ger of attaching too much importance to transitory tactics. In his well-knit
conclusion, however, he unravels with sound judgment tile main threads of his
elaborate design.
In addition, the author in dealing with the problems of 1907 is perhaps too
conscious of the denoucnzent of 1917. This inclines him to be too much aware
of the "illusion" of the Kadets, and too little of the "illusion" of the Social
Democrats. The illusion of the Kadets lay in their firm belief that Russia
could be and ought to be guided towards a genuinely parliamentary regime
without provoking a revolutionary cataclysm-a belief which had certain
grounds of probability in 1907 and was not proved to be an illusion until 1917.
The delusion of the Social Democrats, especially of the Bolshevik wing of the
party, lay in 1907 in their conviction that a new mass revolution like that of
1905 was already on its way and that any idea of moderating revolutionary
agitation in order to safeguard the existence of the Duma against the reaction-
ary forces should therefore be abandoned. This conviction, which was justified
ten years later under entirely different circumstances, was an illusion in 1907.
In the body of this study, though not in its conclusion, the "illusion" of the
Social Democrats is made much less evident than that of the Kadets, although,
of the two, the former was the more important in determining the fate of the
Duma in 1907.
Another weakness in al otherwise remarkably sound study arises from the
deliberate focusing of attention on the Social Democrats. At certain points in
the account this emphasis tends to obscure the fact that the Kadets were far
more active and influential than the Social Democrats in shaping the role of
the newly created parliament. Disproportionate emphasis upon one party could
have been avoided if the study had aimed to describe the second Duma as such,
for then each party would have received a degree of attention determined by
its effective role within the representative assembly. On the other hand, a study
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of the Social-Democratic party alone would have brought into better focus
the party's activities both within and without the Duma. While the method
chosen by the author has its own advantages, it may lead an unprepared reader
to attach a disproportionate importance to the role of the Social Democrats in
the Duma and to the place of the Duma in the policy of the Social-Democratic
party.
PHILIP E. MosIr yt
t Professor of History, Cornell University.
